Joint Precision Fires in Support of Special Forces Operations

USAJFKSWCS

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Definitions

- <u>Special Operations Forces</u> (SOF): 47,000 USAF, USNAV and US Army Special Operations troops. SEALS, 75th Ranger Regiment, AC/MC 130's and the like...
- Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF): Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Ranger, Special Forces, Special Operations Aviation, Special Operations Support Command
- <u>Special Forces</u> (SF): Five active duty and two National Guard SF Groups.
- <u>US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School</u> (USAJFKSWCS): Home of Chief of SF, CA, & PSYOP with statutory oddities.

Premise

Special Forces will continue to conduct Unconventional Warfare with indigenous resistance forces, as well as unilateral or combined Strategic Reconnaissance and Direct Action in the entirety of Battlespace in support of the strategic main effort and/or Conventional Forces, necessitating responsive Precision Joint Fires (both lethal and non-lethal) with virtually unconstrained reach.

Conceptual Requirements

- Precision guided munitions, w/without terminal guidance
- 24/7 all weather coverage
- Reliable, integrated & secure joint communications for command and fires nets
- Standardized joint/interagency/multinational collaboration tools
- Immediately responsive centralized control and deconfliction of joint fires
- Joint fires expertise at all critical junctures (coordination and operational)
- Total coverage of ground battlespace.

Special Forces & Fire Support

- No standing joint fires element within the SF Groups
- No standing joint air control element in the SF Groups
- No dedicated air liaison officers in the SF groups and battalions
- No FSOs within the SF groups and battalions
- Not enough terminal attack controllers to provide combat support

Recent Special Forces Operations

- CJSOTF Bosnia
- SOCCE Kosovo
- CJSOTF Afghanistan (Third Modification)
- CJSOTF West Iraq
- CJSOTF North Iraq
- CJSOTF AP Iraq
- CJSOTF HOA
- Army Component of CJSOTF PI
- Battalion Equivalent Colombia

SF always has a cold start...

- We "blow out" with AC-130 and organic mortars. Grabbing ALOs on the way out.
- Or.... We build a joint fires element from scratch.

• Some observations...

C2 and Collaboration Tools

- Must be accessible by our Coalition Partners
- Software must be installed and Operators must be trained prior to employment
- Common Tool is needed across components which provides both situational awareness and access to JFires/Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) data (ADOCS vs C2PC – CJSOTF/CAOC used ADOCS for joint fires coord and TST)
- Secure time sensitive VTCs with JFIRES providers and CAOC are invaluable

Centralized Control and Deconfliction of Joint Fires

Joint Fires Elements (JFE) must be established and trained for each Special Forces based CJSOTF

- Embedded Joint Air Control Elements(<u>JACE</u>) must work hand-in-glove within each JFE
- FSOs injected valuable experience into the JFE, particularly for planning future operations
- LNOs from the dedicated JFIRES provider(s) must be part of each JFE
- Coalition reps from subordinate Task Forces must be part of each JFE

- Intel Targeteers must be part of each JFE
- JFE must have a reliable, instant <u>collaborative comms</u> package with the SOLE, which is the JFE's link to the CAOC TST cell and the Battlefield Coordination Detachment
- Effective deconfliction of JFIRES in support of SOF will not occur without a trained and capable JFE
- Common Grid Reference System (CGRS) = Speed. Killbox/Keypad system critical to deconflict SF mobile forces

JMD's will not be filled, and will not be filled in time to train!



LESSONS:

- A trained and effective joint fires element prevents fratricide. Many Afghanistan problems eliminated. Combination of TTP & technology.
- No true, common Joint Fires clearance software within the services
 - Example: AFATDS requires manual upload of data into ADOCS and can cause errors as in Millennium Challenge 02 (forces NFAs)

- No fully standardized joint training for JCAS
- No fielded systems allowing digital comms between the SF Team and either the cockpit or the field battery
- Inadequate SF officers and NCOs with actual training in Joint Fires or Joint Targeting
- Service parochialism will eventually cost lives in combat...

What is Special Forces doing?

- Increasing participation at fully Joint CTC exercises, attempting to incorporate foreign forces
- Collaboration on future JIM fires doctrine
- Collaboration on future Joint Fires control and deconfliction systems/software
- JFKSWCS is running a new SOF tactical air controller course at Yuma for SF soldiers, with instructor support from the USMC.
- Demanding progress in Joint Fires, terminology, TTP, software, and simulation


 We are monitoring non-lethal developments, and asking...

Where is the Joint/Combined JCAS simulator????

"Javelin at Debecka Pass!"


- The Field Artillery to think beyond imbedded constructs of support to Army Corps, Divisions, Brigades, Units of Employment and Units of Action.
- FA should be the <u>lead intellectual impetus</u> to place fires wherever, and whenever they are needed in battlespace. Both lethal and non-lethal.
- FA should create floating modules of expertise, to enable the joint force to fight more effectively in the information age environment.
- Forget boundaries and the "who" think of the "what" and "effects."

• Imbedded FA (PCS) – based "JFE" cores in the SF Groups.





Potential home for the ALOs and JACE (from CFACC)

• Embedded (PCS) FA – based "JFE" cores in the SF Groups.



End this....







Fire Support wherever the Army is SOF or conventional....



Modular, responsive, flexible, rapidly deployable, 24/7....





US Army Field Artillery...

• "Go-to guys..." "You call, they haul..."

• "Responsive support anytime, anywhere..."

• "Fire support for the nation..."

You know the quote.